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We examine the cross-country dispersion in fiscal outcomes during 2007-2009. In principle, international
differences in fiscal policy may be related to differences in optimal fiscal positions, funding constraints,
political economy factors and fiscal control problems. We find that the decline in the overall and structural
fiscal balances have been larger for those countries experiencing larger increases in unemployment
and where credit growth during the pre-crisis period was more rapid. However, there is no systematic
co-variation between fiscal outcomes and a larger number of other macroeconomic variables and country
characteristics.
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plane@tcd.ie1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine dierences in scal policies across countries during
the 2007-2009 period. While the global nancial crisis and global recession has presented
many common challenges to countries around the world, it is also the case that national
economies have not been uniformly aected by the global shocks (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
2010). Moreover, there has been considerable dispersion in national macroeconomic
policy responses during the crisis period and it is important to understand the sources of
these policy dierences.
Dierences in national scal policies can arise for a number of reasons. First, opti-
mal scal policies vary across countries in line with dierences in initial conditions and
basic country characteristics. Second, governments may deviate from optimal policies
for country-specic reasons, which may relate to funding constraints, political economy
considerations or scal control issues.
In relation to optimal scal policy, the global crisis has led to a re-surgence of interest
in the role of scal policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool. Central banks have
pushed interest rates to near-zero levels, such that many governments have turned to
activist scal policy in order to combat the negative macroeconomic shock generated by
the crisis in credit markets and banking systems. In turn, this has triggered a vigorous
discussion about the potential eectiveness of scal policy as a stabilisation tool.
In this debate, it was quickly accepted that \one size does not t all" - the optimal
scal response to a macroeconomic shock depends on initial conditions and a basic set
of country characteristics. In an inuential early contribution, Spilimbergo et al (2008)
emphasised that the generic recommendation that countries engage in scal expansion
to combat the global shock is not universally appropriate. In particular, if a country
is already burdened by a high debt level or is perceived to have an unsustainable scal
situation, scal expansion may be self-defeating if it results in funding diculties, higher
credit spreads and a decline in consumer and investor condence.
Moreover, even if a country has the scal space to engage in expansion, the optimal
extent of scal loosening depends on characteristics such as country size and the exchange
rate regime. More generally, optimal scal policy also interacts with the monetary stance
and the health of the banking sector. For instance, a number of authors have highlighted
that scal multipliers may be larger if interest rates are constrained by the zero lower
bound problem (see, amongst others, Christiano et al 2009 and Devereux 2010). Along
other dimensions, Barro and Redlick (2009) estimate that the scal multiplier is larger if
there is slack in the labour market, while Perotti (1999) nds that the level of debt limits
the eectiveness of scal policy. Finally, Turrini et al (2010) nd that scal eectiveness
2is higher during banking crises, due to the impact of scal policy on collateral values.
Cross-country heterogeneity in the eectiveness of scal policy is also highlighted by
the panel empirical work of Ilzetzki et al. (2010). These authors estimate scal multipliers
for dierent groups of countries and show that scal multipliers are smaller for poorer
economies, more open economies, economies with exible exchange rates and economies
with high public debt levels.
Accordingly, national dierences in the optimal scal response to a macroeconomic
shock may provide one set of explanations for the observed heterogeneity in scal be-
haviour during 2007-2009. In relation to the scope for national deviations from optimal
policy, funding constraints, political economy factors and control issues may help to ex-
plain the gap between observed scal responses and those indicated by models featuring
welfare-maximising governments.
As indicated above, scal expansion may be self defeating if an increase in the scal
decit induces an increase in funding costs and funding risk, raising the cost of capital for
private-sector entities and depressing condence. Accordingly, those countries facing a
steeply-increasing credit supply schedule may opt to rein in scal plans relative to others
that do not face similar funding constraints. While this mechanism has been widely
studied in the emerging markets literature and in relation to high-debt episodes among
industrial countries during the 1980s, the compression of yields across advanced-country
sovereigns during the pre-crisis period means that the re-emergence of funding constraints
for this group has been a striking feature of the current crisis.
In addition to funding constraints, scal policy may also deviate from due to political
economy factors. For instance, an extensive literature has developed on how political econ-
omy factors may induce a government to run inappropriately pro-cyclical scal policies.1
During boom periods, the nature of the political equilibrium induces the government to
raise spending and cut taxes. In turn, this requires the government to cut spending and
raise taxes during downturns in order to ensure scal sustainability. For instance, Tornell
and Lane (1999) highlight the \voracity eect" mechanism by which political fragmen-
tation means that public spending pressures increase more than proportionally during
boom years and fall back during recesssions. Talvi and Vegh (2005) postulate that a
budget surplus unleashes intense lobbying pressures to increase public spending or raise
taxes. Facing such pressures, the government chooses to raise spending and cut taxes. In
contrast, the lower level of lobbying during recessions means that the government restores
scal health by cutting spending and raising taxes.
1A partial list of relevant empirical contributions includes Lane (2003), Gal  and Perotti (2003), Talvi
and Vegh (2005), Alesina et al (2008) and Fat as and Mihov (2009). See also the review by Golinelli and
Momigliano (2009).
3In similar vein, Alesina et al (2008) identify an agency problem by which the electorate
knows that governments like to divert resources towards politically-favoured elites or
`rents' for politicians but cannot observe the true level of government borrowing (for
instance, the government may hide liabilities in o balance sheet entitites). Accordingly,
voters require the government to cut taxes or raise spending on public goods during
booms, in order to constrain the political temptation to divert boom-year revenues towards
transfers for politically-favoured elites or `rents' for politicians. The mirror image is for
the government to raise taxes and cut spending during recessions. In this way, the solution
to the agency problem is for voters to call for a procyclical pattern in scal policy. While
this is suboptimal in terms of the volatility of consumption, it is conditionally ecient in
terms of limiting the waste of public resources on socially-useless political rents.
Across the research contributions on scal procyclicality, a common refrain is that
such political distortions can be mitigated by the existence of eective scal rules and
scal institutions. If scal policy is determined in an institutional environment that
insulates the common interest from the adverse impact of sectoral lobbying or political
rent seeking, such distortions can be neutralised and an optimally counter-cyclical scal
policy can be implemented. Indeed, the empirical evidence is that scal procyclicality
is less pronounced in countries with stronger institutions (Woo 2003, Alesina et al 2008).
More specically, there is a body of evidence that indicates that scal rules improves the
cyclical conduct of scal policy. In a panel econometric analysis, European Commission
(2009) nds that those countries that adopt stronger scal rules are more successful in
improving the structural scal balance. A similar result is also obtained by Fabrizio and
Mody (2006), using a dierent index for the strength of budget institutions and a dierent
sample of countries.
In addition to funding constraints and political economy factors, observed scal out-
comes may deviate from optimal scal positions due to a loss of scal control. Beetsma
et al (2009) highlight that implementation failures are a major factor in explaining scal
outcomes, whereby scal balances under-shoot relative to announced plans. One type
of control problem relates to unexpected revenue declines, over and above the level pro-
jected by developments in GDP and unemployment. In particular, there is evidence that
tax revenues are highly sensitive to asset prices and the volume of transactions in asset
and housing markets, such that the normal cyclical adjustment is misleading if there is a
boom-bust cycle in asset markets (Eschenbach and Schuknecht 2004, Girouard and Price
2004).
A second type of control problem relates to the reversal of planned expenditure reduc-
tions or tax increases. A government may announce a scal adjustment package, only to
roll back on some commitments in the face of lobbying pressures. A third type of control
4problem is associated with demand-determined scal initiatives (such as car scrappage
schemes), where it is dicult to estimate the total cost of a given incentive programme.
Taken together, cross-country dierences in optimal scal positions, funding con-
straints, political economy factors and scal control problems can help explain the ob-
served variation in scal outcomes during the 2007-2009 phase of the global crisis. Using
these factors as a guide, our goal in this paper is to examine the co-variates of scal
outcomes in order to establish whether the international dierences in scal policy can
be related to a set of macroeconomic and institutional characteristics. If such systemic
patterns are indeed evident in the data, this can help to identify future priorities for
theoretical and empirical research on scal policy.
Our focus on the cross-country variation in scal outcomes is part of a broader stream
of research that seeks to understand international dierences in how countries have been
aected by the global crisis. In related studies, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) empir-
ically investigate the co-variates of cross-country dierences in growth performance and
aggregate demand dynamics during the global crisis, while Giannone et al (2010) relate
the cross-country variation in growth to a set of institutional variables.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
empirical strategy. Section 3 examines the distribution of scal outcomes and analyses
the bivariate relations between scal outcomes and the set of potential co-variates. We
turn to regression analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
Our main focus is on analysing cross-country variation in the change in the scal balance
(expressed as a ratio to GDP) between 2007 and 2009.2 Dierences in the timing of budget
processes across countries and in the transmission of the global nancial shock mean that
it is more insightful to consider the shift in the scal position over a two-year window
rather than examining cross-country variation in scal behaviour at a higher frequency. In
our robustness analysis, we also examine alternative scaling factors for the scal balance.
For the advanced economies, we also consider the change in the structural scal bal-
ance, in addition to the overall balance. However, estimates of the structural balance are
not widely available for the broader sample that includes emerging market economies.
Moreover, an accurate decomposition of the overall balance between structural and cycli-
cal elements is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, especially in view of the special
features of the current downturn.
2Furthermore, it is worth noting that there is also a very high correlation between scal balances in
2009 and the projected scal balances for 2010.
5In addition, we separately examine the revenue and expenditure sides of the scal
balance for the advanced economies. In this way, we may obtain extra insight into the
driving forces behind the dynamics of the overall balance.
We model the optimal scal response to the global crisis as varying across countries
in line with a set of macroeconomic variables and country characteristics
FBAL
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where GROWi is the growth of GDP and Xi is a set of other potential determinants of the
optimal scal response. In line with the discussion in the previous section, we experiment
with a range of candidate variables. These include the shift in the unemployment rate as
another contemporaneous variable. In common with the GDP growth rate, these variables
are surely endogenous to the scal position but we do not attempt to sort out causality at
this juncture. Rather, we include these variables since we want to ensure that the other
regressors are not operating solely through these channels.
In addition, we draw from a list of pre-determined variables. These include the 2007
level of GDP per capita, the 2007 debt/GDP ratio, the level of trade openness, country
size, the exchange rate regime and the level of international nancial integration.
The level of per capita output may matter for several reasons. In one direction, it
is plausible that credit constraints are more extensive among households and rms in
lower-income countries, suggesting that scal policy may be powerful in these countries
(see, amongst others, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002). In the other direction, lower-income
countries may be perceived as higher credit risks, limiting the ability of these countries
to fund large scal decits. In addition to these conicting forces, the nancial crisis was
more severe in more-developed economies, such that the impetus for scal intervention
may have been stronger in richer economies.
A high outstanding level of public debt may constrain the scal response due to
concerns about scal sustainability. We include trade openness, since open-economy
macroeconomic models project that the eectiveness of scal policy is lower in more open
economies due to the lower sensitivity of domestic production to the level of domestic
demand. In similar vein, scal eectiveness may be more limited for smaller countries.
Moreover, smaller countries may face more severe funding constraints, in view of the more
limited scope to issue local-currency debt instruments to international investors.
We include the exchange rate regime as another candidate variable, since the macroe-
conomic impact of scal policy depends on the exchange rate response to a scal shock.
To the extent that scal expansion induces currency appreciation, scal policy may be less
eective under a exible exchange rate regime relative to a xed exchange rate regime (or
6membership of a currency union) as a result of the osetting impact of currency appreci-
ation. However, in the other direction, if scal expansion is accomodated by monetary
loosening under a oat, this ordering may be reversed. In addition, a xed exchange rate
(or currency union) may impose constraints on the conduct of scal policy in order to
copperfasten the credibility of the regime, such that scal policy may be tighter under a
peg or currency union relative to a oating-rate regime.
We also examine the level of international nancial integration as a potential co-variate
of scal policy. A high degree of international nancial integration may exert a discipline
eect on the conduct of scal policy (Kose et al 2009). In the other direction, nancial
integration may improve the sovereign's access to debt markets in view of the presumed
higher default penalty for nancially-integrated economies.
In addition to this set of pre-determined variables, we also examine some additional
contemporaneous variables. Since reverse causation is a more obvious problem for these
variables, we report these in a separate set of regressions. The goal in this case is to
establish the co-variates of scal policy, while recognising the bi-directional nature of
causation for these variables. We consider ve variables in this set. First, we examine
the change in the ten-year government bond yield during 2007-2009. While the bond
yield is obviously a function of the scal position, it is also the case that market funding
signals inuence scal choices, with a sharp increase in the spread a potent inuence in
the direction of greater scal restraint.
Second, we look at the change in the real exchange rate over 2007-2009. This is in
order to establish whether the de facto level of easing provided by the real exchange rate
co-varies with the scal position. Third, we look at downgrades in the sovereign credit
rating. As with the bond yield, there are bi-directional inuences in the relation between
rating downgrades and the scal position.
Fourth, we ask whether there is co-variation between the incidence of banking crises
and the scal position. In one direction, the evidence of Reinhart and Rogo (2009) is
that banking crises are associated with signicant deterioration in scal positions. In
the other, a banking crisis may trigger an increase in funding costs for the sovereign,
limiting the scale of scal expansion. Finally, we ask whether those countries with IMF
programmes display dierent scal behaviour to other countries. Again, we can think of
opposing forces: while the existence of an IMF programme may reect scal weakness, the
availability of non-commercial nancing may facilitate a larger scal decit than would
otherwise be possible.
We also expect that observed scal outcomes will dier from optimal scal positions
due to political economy distortions and scal control issues
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where the Zi vector includes an index of decision-making constraints in the political
system, the existence of scal rules and the scale of nancial imbalances during the run
up to the crisis.
Our measure of checks and balances in the political system is the political constraints
index developed by Henisz (2000), which is regularly updated. This variable has been
used in the scal literature by Lane (2003) and Fatas and Mihov (2003), with the notion
that scal procyclicality may be abetted by a larger number of veto points in the political
system - with the fragmentation of political power, it is more dicult to generate the
surpluses during good times that provide the scal space for activist scal expansion
in response to negative macroeconomic shocks. (In the other direction, a large number
of veto points can improve the stability of scal policy by reducing the likelihood of
discretionary scal interventions.) In relation to scal rules, we focus on those rules that
limit the accumulation of public debt.3 If such rules are binding, this may limit the scal
response to the crisis.
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), nancial imbalances are measured by the
2007 current account balance and the rate of private-sector credit growth during 2003-
2007. The presumption is that high capital inows and rapid lending growth may have
generated revenue windfalls during the pre-crisis period due to the associated wealth
and balance-sheet eects on consumption and investment, in addition to the revenues
directly generated by nancial transactions, capital gains taxes and taxes on nancial-
sector prots. Once the crisis hit, these windfall revenues may have plunged, leading to
an unplanned deterioration in the scal balance.
It is also important to highlight that these pre-crisis nancial imbalances may also
operate through an additional channel. In particular, nancial imbalances may be as-
sociated with an increase in funding risk and funding costs for governments during the
crisis period itself, due to concerns about post-crisis growth prospects, the socialisation
of banking-sector losses and the feasibility of scal adjustment.
It is also important to recognise that the Zi vector plausibly overlaps with the Xi
vector, since variables such as the unemployment rate and country size may operate
through funding constraints or political economy channels in addition to their impact on
optimal scal policy. Accordingly, the reduced-form equation for the scal balance may
be written as
FBALi =  + GROWi + Xi + Zi + "i (3)
3We also investigated scal rules that limit expenditure growth.
8where the estimated coecients may reect multiple channels by which the regressors
co-vary with the scal balance.
We consider two samples. The narrow sample consists of twenty-two advanced economies,
while the broader sample additionally includes thirty emerging market economies. Table
1 lists the countries in these samples. The advantage of the narrow sample is greater data
availability and similarity in economic characteristics; the broader sample oers more
degrees of freedom and greater variation in the key variables.
3 Data and Bivariate Analysis
As a rst pass at the data, we compare the scal outcomes during 2007-2009 to previous
scal experience. Next, we examine the cross-country distribution of changes in the scal
position during the crisis. Subsequently, we report a set of bivariate relations, linking scal
behaviour to a range of macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Table 2 compares the distribution of the shift in scal balances during 2007-2009 to
previous periods (for the advanced-country sample). The mean decline in the scal balance
is 7.1 percentage points of GDP - the next largest in the sample is the 3.3 percentage point
mean shift in 1973-1975. Moreover, the cross-sectional standard deviation in 2007-2009
is larger than in any previous two-year interval during the 1973-2007 period.
In Table 3, we compare scal outcomes for individual countries compared to historical
experience. For fteen out of the twenty-two advanced countries, the decline in the scal
balance during 2007-2009 is larger than in any previous two-year period since 1973.
Figure 1 plots the cross-country density function for the change in the scal balance
between 2007 and 2009 for two groups: (a) the set of 22 advanced economies; and (b) the
broader set of 52 advanced and emerging economies. The data show that the advanced
country group had a larger scal deterioration than the broader group. Taking the full set
of countries, only one country experienced an improvement in the scal balance between
2007 and 2009, with the Hungarian position improving by one percentage point of GDP.
At the other extreme, Iceland had the largest scal decline at 17.8 percentage points of
GDP.
Figure 2 plots the actual 2009 scal balances against the 2009 balances that were
projected in 2007, with the upper panel showing the overall balance and the lower panel
the structural balance. The data show that the decline in scal balances was largely
unexpected (relative to expectations in 2007), with all countries to the right of the 45
degree line. Moreover, the surprise element was larger for the structural balance than for
the overall balance.
Figure 3 shows a strong connection between output dynamics during the crisis and
9scal developments, with those countries exhibiting a larger decline in GDP typically
having a larger expansion in scal decits. However, Figure 3 also illustrates that there
is also considerable dispersion in scal outcomes for a given GDP performance, such that
other factors have also been inuential in determining scal dynamics.
Next, we examine the bivariate relations between the shift in the scal balance and a
host of economic and institutional variables by comparing the values between the upper
and lower terciles of the scal distribution.4. We label these the Upper and Lower terciles,
based on the scale of the general government balance deterioration. The former group
contains countries with the largest decline in the scal balance, while the latter group
contains those with the smallest scal declines. Table 4 shows the statistics for the
advanced country group, while 5 shows the statistics for the broader \advanced plus
emerging" group. The tables report the mean and median values for each variable for the
upper and lower terciles. In addition, the nal column shows the dierence in means across
the upper and lower terciles and reports whether the dierence is statistically signicant.
Table 4 shows that the mean decline in the scal balance was 7.4 percentage points
larger for the Upper tercile compared to the Lower tercile among the advanced countries.
While public spending grew more quickly for the former group, the mean dierence is
not statistically signicant and is much lower than the mean dierence in revenue growth
across the terciles. Indeed, the Lower tercile only experienced an average revenue decline
of 0.8 percent, while the average revenue decline the Upper tercile was a striking 21.7
percent.
Row (4) shows that there was a large proportion of the scal decline was structural
in nature, with the decline in the structural balance 5.8 percentage points larger for the
Upper tercile than for the Lower tercile. It is important to emphasise that the variation
in scal balances bears little relationship to the announced discretionary scal stimulus
plans | row (5) shows that scal stimulus packages were quite small and did not dier
signicantly across terciles.
In relation to macroeconomic performance, row (6) shows that the dierence in the
scale of the GDP contraction across the terciles is not statistically signicant. However,
as is recorded in row (7), the Upper tercile experienced an average increase in the un-
employment rate of 4.4 percentage points, whereas the mean unemployment rate for the
Lower tercile only grew by 0.7 percentage points.
Next, we turn to a set of country characteristics in terms of the state of the economy at
the beginning of the crisis in 2007. Rows (8)-(12) show that richer countries experienced a
4For the advanced country group, we report the data for the seven countries at each end of the
distribution, excluding the middle eight countries. For the advanced plus emerging group, we report the
data for the seventeen countries at each end of the distrubiton, excluding the middle eighteen countries.
10bigger decline in scal balances than poorer countries but also that there are not signicant
dierences across terciles in terms of the pre-crisis level of public debt, the level of trade
openness, country size or the exchange rate regime.
However, rows (13)-(14) highlight that the terciles signicantly diered in terms of
external balances and the scale of credit growth during the pre-crisis period. Whereas
the mean current account balance for the Lower tercile in 2007 was a surplus of 2.8
percent of GDP, the mean current account balance for the Upper tercile was a decit of
5.7 percent of GDP. Similarly, there is striking dierence in terms of credit growth during
the pre-crisis period - the Lower tercile saw an average expansion of 13.9 percent over
2003-2007, whereas it was 56.6 percent for the Upper tercile. Accordingly, the decline in
scal positions may be connected to the cross-country incidence of nancial imbalances
during the pre-crisis period.
Rows (15)-(16) consider whether scal institutions and the design of the political
system made a dierence to scal dynamics during the crisis. Fiscal rules restricting the
dynamics of public debt are more prevalent in the Lower tercile than in the Upper tercile
but the dierence is not statistically signicant. However, the Upper tercile on average
have political systems with fewer checks and balances than the Lower tercile.
Rows (17)-(23) examine whether there are clear dierences across the terciles in how
other key macroeconomic and nancial variables unfolded during the crisis. While inter-
tercile dierences are typically not signicant for most of these variables, the Upper tercile
experienced signicant real depreciation compared to the Lower tercile. In addition, the
Upper tercile experienced a sharp current account reversal, whereas the Lower tercile
saw a slight decline in the external balance. In relation to the other variables, both
terciles experienced a decline in ten-year bond yields. Banking crises and downgrades
in sovereign credit ratings have been more prevalent in the Upper tercile (in fact, no
country in the Lower tercile experienced a rating downgrade during 2007-2009). For the
advanced country group, only Iceland (in the Upper tercile) entered an IMF program
during 2007-2009.5
Table 5 conduct the same exercise for the extended sample that includes both advanced
and emerging economies. Many of the data patterns are quite similar to those in Table 4
but some important dierences do emerge. First, GDP growth is signicantly lower for
the Upper tercile in this broader sample, while the Upper tercile is also characterised by a
higher average GDP per capita. The rate of pre-crisis credit growth remains signicantly
dierent across the terciles, but the inter-tercile dierence in pre-crisis current account
balances is not signicant for the broader sample. Banking crises and rating downgrades
5The Greek program was only initiated in the rst part of 2010, which falls outside the scope of our
study.
11are signicantly more prevalent for the Upper tercile than for the Lower tercile. The
average ten-year bond yield actually increased for the Upper tercile and fell for the Lower
tercile but the dierence in means across the groups is not signicant. Finally, we note
that output growth in trading partners was signicantly worse for the Upper tercile group
than for the Lower tercile group and that the Upper tercile are more nancially integrated
than the Lower tercile.
In summary, the bivariate analysis highlights some useful patterns in the data. For
the advanced-country group, larger declines in the scal balance have a large structural
component and reect bigger contractions in public revenues. Moreover, larger declines in
the scal balance are pairwise correlated with bigger increases in the unemployment rate,
higher output per capita, more rapid pre-crisis credit growth, larger pre-crisis current
account deicits and fewer checks and balances in the political system. Finally, those
advanced countries experiencing larger scal declines also underwent more real exchange
rate depreciation and a larger turnaround in the current account balance during the crisis.
Albeit with some renements, very similar data patterns also are found for the broader
sample of advanced plus emerging economies.
In the next section, we move beyond bivariate analysis and report the results of mul-
tivariate regression estimates.
4 Regression Evidence
As in the previous subsection, we separately consider results for the narrow sample of
advanced economies and the broad sample that includes both advanced and emerging
economies. All regressions are cross-sectional and are least-square estimates (with robust
standard errors). The main focus is on examining the covariates of the shift in the general
government balance (scaled by GDP) between 2007-2009. However, we will also discuss
in detail the results for a variety of other dependent variables.
4.1 The Overall Fiscal Balance
Tables 6-7 show the results for the advanced sample, while Table 8-9 show the results for
the broader advanced plus emerging sample.
We begin in Table 6 by examining the co-variation between the shift in the scal
balance and a limited set of country characteristics. Each specication includes output
growth from 2007 to 2009 as a general control variable. The simple bivariate regression of
the change in the scal balance on output growth in reported in column (1) | while output
growth is signicant at the 10 percent level, 88 percent of the cross-country variation in
12the scal position is uncorrelated with output growth. Column (2) adds the change in
the unemployment rate between 2007 and 2009. The unemployment variable is highly
signicant and renders the output growth rate individually insignicant; moreover, the
R2 jumps from 0.12 to 0.54. The strong signicance of the unemployment variable meant
that we opted to include this variable in all other specications in Table 6. Figure
4 shows that there is a signicant negative correlation between output growth and the
change in the unemployment rate (for the broad sample of countries) but also that there
is considerable variation in unemployment performance for a given interval of growth
outcomes.
In columns (3)-(9), we add other variables on a sequential basis. (In column (5),
we jointly add the current account balance and pre-crisis credit growth since we view
this pair of variables as jointly proxying for pre-crisis imbalances.) The focus in this
table is on pre-crisis indicators (the initial debt-output ratio, current account balance,
the pre-crisis rate of credit growth) and on relatively-xed policy regime and institutional
variables (trade openness, country size, exchange rate regime, political orientation of the
government, the existence of a debt-focused scal rule), since these variables may be
viewed as generally pre-determined in relation to the shift in scal balances between 2007
and 2009. It turns out the only variables that are individually signicant are the pre-crisis
rate of credit expansion in column (5) and the political constraints index in column (8).
Those countries that experienced credit booms during the pre-crisis period experienced a
substantially larger decline in the scal balance, while more checks and balances in the
political system is associated with a smaller scal decline. It is important to highlight
that the relation between credit growth and scal outcomes is a partial correlation, since
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) also show that faster credit growth during the pre-crisis
period is associated with a larger output decline during the crisis period. We also note
that the R2 in column (5) is 0.75, which is a large jump relative to the R2 of 0.54 in the
benchmark regression in column (2).
In column (10), we jointly enter both pre-crisis credit growth and the political con-
straints index. Both are individually signicant in this expanded regression.
As was discussed in the introduction, it is possible that some of these country charac-
teristics may aect the sensitivity of the scal balance to output growth. We explored
this by adding interaction terms between output growth and the other regressors on a
sequential basis. However, none of these interaction terms turned out to be signicant.
In Table 7, we examine a dierent set of regressors, while retaining output growth and
the change in the unemployment rate as core variables in the specication. In Table 7,
the focus is on co-variation between the shift in the scal balance and contemporaneous
shifts in other key macroeconomic variables during the crisis period. In this case, it
13is not feasible to establish the lines of causality between the scal position and these
simultaneously-determined variables.
We consider four variables: the ten-year bond yield; downgrades to the sovereign
credit rating; the real exchange rate; and a banking crisis dummy variable. While there is
no signicant co-variation between the change in the ten-year bond yield or the banking
crisis dummy and the shift in the scal balance, the shift in the real exchange rate is only
marginally insignicant (with the sign being that scal deterioration is associated with
real depreciation). In contrast, there is evidence of strong co-variation between scal
decline and ratings downgrades, with scal deterioration clearly one factor driving rating
decisions.6
We next turn to the expanded sample that includes both advanced and emerging
economies, with the results reported in Tables 8 and 9. The specications are very
similar to those in Tables 6 and 7. The main exception is that we add the level of
GDP per capita to the benchmark specication, in view of the large dierences in the
level of development across this sample and the high correlation between GDP per capita
and many other institutional characteristics. In addition, we also include an indicator
of international nancial integration in row (11) of Table 8 . The motivation is that,
whereas all advanced economies have a high degree of eective integration with the global
nancial system, some emerging market economies have relatively low holdings of cross-
border assets and liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, 2008).
For many specications, the results for the extended sample in Table 8 are similar
to those for the advanced country sample in Table 6. One dierence is that the GDP
growth rate is signicant across the specications for the broader sample. In addition,
the level of GDP per capita is highly signicant across columns (3)-(11) and its inclusion
doubles the overall explanatory power from 0.20 in column (2) to 0.41 in column (3).
The unemployment rate and the rate of pre-crisis credit growth remains highly signicant
in this broader sample. The main dierence is that the political constraints index is not
individually signicant in this broader sample. We note that the scal rule variable is only
marginally insignicant in column (10) and that the international nancial integration
dummy is not signicant in column (11).
The next set of regressions is reported in Table 9. None of the additional regressors
are individually signicant for this broader sample.
In Tables 6-9, the scal balance has been measured as a ratio to GDP. In order to
check that the results are not simply driven by changes in the denominator (GDP), we
also ran the regressions for an alternative measure of the scal balance. We constructed
6We again tried interaction eects between these variables and output growth. However, none of these
interaction eects were signicant.
14FBALALT = REV=EXP and examined the shift in FBALALT between 2007 and 2009.
The results are very similar for this alternative measure, with the natural exception that
GDP growth itself is typically less signicant as a regressor.7
4.2 The Structural Balance
In Tables 6-9, the focus has been on the overall scal balance. In order to strip out the
impact of automatic stabilisers, it is also useful to examine the shift in the structural scal
balance in Tables 10 and 11. (This is only feasible for the advanced-country sample.) A
shift in the structural balance can arise if governments initiate new spending programmes
or tax reductions that are not automatically undone by a return to potential output.
In addition, the structural decit can increase if there is a decline in some types of tax
revenue that are not projected to recover in line with GDP.
Column (1) of Table 10 shows that the shifts in the structural balance bear little
relation to developments in GDP growth. However, there is signicant co-variation
between the shift in the unemployment rate and the structural balance: the addition of
the unemployment rate in column (2) leads to an increase in overall explanatory power
from 0.03 to 0.37. As in Table 6, the pre-crisis rate of credit growth and the political
constraints index are each individually signicant in columns (5) and (8) respectively.
However, only credit growth remains individually signicant in the expanded specication
in column (10).
We examine the co-variation between the set of contemporaneous macroeconomic vari-
ables and the structural balance in Table 11. The only individually signicant variable
is the real exchange rate - real depreciation is associated with a larger decline in the
structural balance. The rating downgrade variable is only marginally insignicant in
column (2).
In summary, it appears that the unemployment rate operates not only through the
measured cyclical component of the budget but also through the structural element. In
addition, the rate of pre-crisis credit growth is also associated with a decline in the struc-
tural balance. Those economies experiencing real depreciation have also seen a decline in
the structural balance.
7These results are available upon request from the authors.
154.3 Shifts in Revenues and Public Spending
Next, we ask whether the patterns for the overall scal balance can be systematically
related to the individual evolution of revenues and public spending.8 We ran the same
set of specications as in Tables 6-9 for revenue growth and expenditure growth.9 We
measured growth in two ways. First, we calculated revenue and expenditure growth in
real terms (deated by the GDP deator). Second, in order to provide comparability to
the measure of the scal balance, we also examined shifts in the ratios of revenues and
expenditure to GDP.
In relation to the former measure and taking rst the advanced-country sample, we
nd that the change in the unemployment rate is typically associated with a signicant
decline in revenues. Only when we control for private credit growth is unemployment a
signicant covariate with expenditure growth. Private credit growth is highly signicant
in both revenue and expenditure equations - it is signicantly associated with both a de-
cline in revenues and a decline in expenditure. In relation to the other regressors in Table
6, the initial debt-GDP ratio is signicantly associated with both faster revenue growth
and faster expenditure growth; the only other variable that is individually signicant is
that smaller countries experienced slower expenditure growth. In relation to the contem-
poraneous variables examined in Table 7, real exchange rate depreciation is signicantly
associated with both lower revenues and lower expenditure.
If revenues and expenditure are scaled relative to GDP, there are some dierences in
results. First, both GDP growth and the shift in the unemployment rate are signicant
across the specications in being associated with a decline in the revenue ratio and an
increase in the expenditure ratio. Private credit growth is signicantly associated with
an increase in the expenditure ratio but not with the revenue ratio. In terms of the other
variables, more open economies experienced a smaller decline in the revenue ratio. In
relation to the contemporaneous variables, rating downgrades signicantly co-vary with a
reduction in the revenue ratio and an increase in the expenditure ratio, while real exchange
rate depreciation is associated with a decline in the revenue ratio.
For the broader sample, the real growth rates of revenues and expenditure signicantly
covary with several variables. Private credit growth is associated with lower growth
in both revenue and expenditure, while more exible exchange rate regimes are also
associated with lower revenue and expenditure. In addition, more nancially integrated
economies experience more rapid expenditure growth. In relation to the contemporaneous
8This is a useful but limited exercise. In particular, the cross-section dispersion in the scal balance
depends on the cross-sectional covariance between revenues and expenditure in addition to the individual
cross-section distributions of revenues and expenditure.
9These results are available upon request from the authors but are not included in the paper in order
to conserve space.
16variables, real exchange rate depreciation and the existence of an IMF programme covaries
with slower revenue and expenditure.
If we examine revenue and expenditure ratios for the broader sample, some dierent
patterns emerge. Pre-crisis private credit growth is associated with a lower revenue ratio
and higher expenditure ratio, while more nancially integrated economies see a larger
decline in the revenue ratio. Among the contemporaneous variables, banking crises are
associated with a decline in the revenue ratio, while the existence of an IMF programme
is associated with a decline in expenditure ratio.
Some of these individual results may warrant further investigation in studies that are
more directly focused on the cross-country distributions of revenues and expenditure. In
relation to understanding the evolution of the overall scal balance, the key results are
that slower GDP growth and an increase in the unemployment rate are both associated
with a decline in the revenue ratio and an increase in the expenditure ratio. Moreover, the
rate of pre-crisis private credit growth is associated with an increase in the expenditure
ratio for both samples and a reduction in the revenue ratio for the broader sample.
Finally, it would also be informative to examine the composition of the revenue decline
between 2007 and 2009. In particular, it is plausible that the pre-crisis credit growth vari-
able is in part a proxy for boom conditions in local asset and housing markets. During the
crisis, asset-related revenues were especially hit in a number of countries due to reversals
in asset prices and a decline in the volume of asset transactions. However, reversals in
asset markets may also operate more broadly through wealth eects on consumption and
the impact on investment levels. While the decomposition of tax revenue for 2009 is not
yet available, an inspection of the composition of the decline in revenues between 2007
and 2008 shows substantial variation across countries. Among those countries experienc-
ing the most severe crises, indirect taxes were the most important source of the revenue
decline in Iceland, while it was individual income taxation in Ireland and corporation tax
in Spain. The direct contribution of asset-related taxes was a contributory factor but was
too small to be the dominant factor.
4.4 Robustness
In this subsection, we further report on alternative specications and alternative estima-
tion methods. For data availability reasons, we focus on the advanced-country sample.
To conserve space, most of these results are not shown in tabular format but are available
upon request.
First, the unemployment rate may not be a sucient indicator for the state of the
labour market. In particular, adjustment may also take the form of a reduction in hours
17worked and this option has been promoted through \short-time" initiatives in some coun-
tries (as in Germany). Accordingly, we included the change in hours worked between 2007
and 2009 as a regressor. If it is entered as a substitute for the unemployment rate, it is
never individually signicant. If it is entered in addition to the unemployment rate, it is
only signicant (at the 10 percent level) in the specications shown in columns (8) and
(10) of Table 6 but otherwise it is not individually signicant. Accordingly, there is some
partial evidence that a decline in hours worked is associated with a more negative scal
balance, over and above the role played by the unemployment rate.
Second, we have not controlled for dierences in monetary policy across countries
(except via the inclusion of the exchange rate regime dummy). We ran regressions
in which the change in the policy nominal interest rate between 2007 and 2009 was
included as an additional explanatory variable. The policy rate was never signicant
and its inclusion did not aect the other results. This reects the limited cross-country
variation in policy rates for the advanced countries during 2007-2009, since all countries
engaged in signicant interest rate cuts. A further factor is that the policy rate is common
for all members of the euro area, such that monetary policy cannot help to explain intra-
area variation in scal outcomes.10
Third, our regressions so far have focused on the relation between domestic variables
and domestic scal outcomes. We also explored whether foreign variables provided addi-
tional explanatory power by adding foreign output growth and the foreign scal outcome
(separately and jointly) as additional regressors, where these variables were measured as
weighted averages across trading partners. Since our regressions already include domestic
output growth and the domestic unemployment rate, the foreign variables may already
indirectly contribute through their inuence on the domestic macroeconomic and scal
environment and any additional role must operate through some other mechanisms. It
turns out that these variables are not signicant in most specications and do not aect
the signicance of the other regressors. The exceptions are that the foreign scal balance
is signicantly positive (at the ten percent level) in the specications corresponding to
columns (9) and (10) in Table 6 if foreign output growth is excluded and in the specica-
tions corresponding to columns (8) and (10) in Table 6 if foreign output growth is included.
The mechanism by which the foreign scal balance matters in these specications is not
clear, especially in view of the host of other regressors in the specication.
10As an alternative, we also ran regressions with the change in the ex-post real interest rate as an
explanatory variable (the policy rate minus realised ination). This was signicantly positive - lower
real rates being associated with worse scal outcomes. Moreover, the inclusion of the real rate rendered
private credit individually insignicant. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the signicance of the
real rate is entirely driven by Iceland, since it experienced both a sizeable surge in ination and a severe
scal deterioration.
18So far, we have reported least-squares estimates, without addressing the potential en-
dogeneity of output growth and the unemployment rate to the scal balance. We next
report instrumental-variables estimates. We use the pre-crisis values of a set of instru-
ments. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) nd roles for the 2007 values of the manufacturing
share in output, the trade share and the level of GDP per capita in explaining the cross-
country variation in output growth during 2007-2009 and we include these variables in
our instrument list. Furthermore, structural characteristics of the labour market may
also have inuenced unemployment dynamics during the crisis. Accordingly, we also in-
clude the ratio of temporary to permanent employees, the OECD employment protection
legislation (EPL) index and the 2007 level of the unemployment rate in the instrument
list. These instruments perform well in rst-stage regressions for output growth and the
change in the unemployment rate and the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic indicates these are
suciently strong instruments and span the two endogenous regressors.
We report IV estimates for the overall scal balance equation in Table 12 and the
structural scal balance equation in Table 13 (correspoding to the least-squares estimates
reported in Table 6 and Table 10). The IV estimates in Table 12 are qualitatively quite
similar to those in Table 6, with the exception that GDP growth enters with a negative
sign in most regressions (but insignicantly). The only change in terms of signicance
is that GDP growth is now marginally signicant in columns (2) and (7). The absolute
value of the point estimate for the coecient on the unemployment rate is larger in most
of the cases.
Turning to the IV estimates for the structural balance in Table 13, these are again quite
similar to those in Table 10 for most variables. Output growth is now signicantly negative
in most specications, while the unemployment rate is no longer individually signicant in
column (5). The negative sign on output growth may reect the fact that those economies
suering the worst output declines had structural balances that were already large in 2007
and were less able to engage in the types of scal stimulus programmes that increase the
structural decit.
Finally, it is useful to establish whether the relations between the regressors and scal
outcomes during 2007-2009 are dierent to previous intervals. Accordingly, we ran a
pooled regression over four two-year intervals (2001-2003, 2003-2005, 2005-2007 and 2007-
2009) where we allow the coecients during the crisis period to dier from the other
periods.
The results are reported in Table 14. The pooled regression shows that the links
between scal outcomes, GDP growth and the unemployment rate during the crisis were
similar to those in previous intervals. This is also true for the role played by the political
constraints index. However, the lagged rate of private credit growth is only signicant
19during the crisis period. In addition, the role played by the lagged level of public debt also
changes sign during the crisis period. During previous intervals, there is a positive relation
between the lagged level of public debt and the improvement in the budget balance. In
contrast, the pooled estimates indicate that more indebted countries experienced worse
scal outcomes during the crisis.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore the international dierences in scal outcomes
during the 2007-2009 phase of the global crisis. This episode is especially important in
view of the scale of the shift in scal positions and the heterogeneity in scal policies
across countries.
Our results indicate that the shifts in scal balances can be systematically related to
changes in the unemployment rate and the rate of pre-crisis private credit growth. In
addition, there is some evidence that political systems with more checks and balances ex-
perienced a smaller decline in the scal balance. Since these variables signicantly co-vary
with measures of the structural balance, the mechanisms linking these variables to scal
outcomes cannot be simply attributed to purely cyclical factors. Moreover, the relation
between lagged private credit growth and scal outcomes was signicantly dierent during
the crisis relative to more normal periods. In the broader sample, scal balances are also
signicantly related to the level of GDP per capita - the decline in the scal balance was
larger in richer economies.
In general, most other variables that we have examined turned out not to be individ-
ually signicant in multi-variate regressions even if a number showed signicant bivariate
covariation with scal outcomes. It is not too surprising that some of these variables were
not signicant, in view of the multiple and opposing channels by which these variables
may be linked to scal outcomes.
A limitation of our approach is that we cannot disentangle the dierent mechanisms by
which the regressors inter-relate with scal outcomes. It would be desirable to establish
whether the observed co-variation patterns reect dierences in optimal scal policy,
funding constraints, political economy factors or scal control issues. For instance, the
signicant co-variation between unemployment and scal outcomes calls out for further
analysis of the channels by which labour market conditions have aected scal policy
during the crisis.
20References
Alesina, Alberto, Filipe R. Campante and Guido Tabellini (2008), \Why is Fiscal Policy
Often Procyclical?," Journal of the European Economic Association 6(5), 1006-1036.
Barro, Robert J. and Charles J. Redlick (2009), \Macroeconomic Eects from Govern-
ment Purchases and Taxes," NBER Working Paper No. 15369.
Beetsma, Roel, Massimo Giuliodori and Peter Wierts (2009), \Budgeting versus Imple-
menting Fiscal Policy in the EU," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7285.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo (2009), \When is the Gov-
ernment Spending Multiplier Large?," mimeo, Northwestern University,
Devereux, Michael B. (2010), \Fiscal Decits, Debt, and Monetary Policy in a Liquidity
Trap," Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 581.
Debrun, Xavier, Moulin Laurent, Alessandro Turrini, Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals and Man-
mohan S. Kumar (2008), \Tied to the Mast? National Fiscal Rules in the European
Union," Economic Policy 23(4), 297-362.
Eschenbach, Felix and Ludger Schuknecht (2004), \Budgetary Risks from Real Estate
and Stock markets," Economic Policy 39, 313-346.
European Commission (2009), \Fiscal Rules, Independent Institutions and Medium-
Term Budgetary Frameworks," in Public Finances in EMU - 2009, Chapter 4.
Fabrizio, Stefania and Ashoka Mody (2006), \Can Budget Institutions Counteract Po-
litical Indiscipline?," Economic Policy 21, 689-739.
Fat as, Antonio and Ilian Mihov (2003), \The Case For Restricting Fiscal Policy Discre-
tion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1419-1447.
Fat as, Antonio and Ilian Mihov (2009), \The Euro and Fiscal Policy," NBER Working
Paper No. 14722.
Gal , Jordi and Roberto Perotti (2003), \Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in
Europe," Economic Policy 18(37), 533-572.
Giannone, Domenico, Michele Lenza and Lucrezia Reichlin (2010), \Market Freedom
and the Global Recession," IMF Economic Review, forthcoming.
21Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano (1990), \Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be
Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries," in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 1990, Volume 5, 75-122.
Girouard, Nathalie and Robert Price (2004), \Asset Price Cycles, \One-O" Factors
and Structural Budget Balances," OECD Economics Department Working Paper
No. 391.
Golinelli, Roberto and Sandro Momigliano (2009), \The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal
Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages,"
Fiscal Studies 30(1), 39-72.
Henisz, Witold (2000), \The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth, " Eco-
nomics and Politics 12, 1-31.
International Monetary Fund (2010), Fiscal Monitor, Navigating the Fiscal Challenges
Ahead.
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Enrique Mendoza and Carlos A. Vegh (2010), \How Big (Small?) are
Fiscal Multipliers?," mimeo, London School of Economics.
Kose, Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogo and Shang-Jin Wei (2009), \Financial
Globalization and Economic Policies," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7117.
Lane, Philip R. (2003), \The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD,"
Journal of Public Economics 87, 2661-2675.
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007), \The External Wealth of Nations
Mark II," Journal of International Economics 73, 223-250.
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2008), \International Investment Pat-
terns," Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3), 538-549.
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2010), \The Cross-Country Incidence
of the Global Crisis," IMF Economic Review, forthcoming.
Perotti, Roberto (1999), \Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad," The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114, 1399-1436.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogo (2009), \The Aftermath of Financial
Crises," American Economic Review 99(2), 466-72.
22Spilimbergo, Antonio, Steven Symansky, Olivier Blanchard and Carlo Cottarelli (2008),
\Fiscal Policy for the Crisis," IMF Sta Position Note No. 08/01.
Talvi, Ernesto and Carlos A. Vegh (2005), \Tax Base Variability and Procyclical Fiscal
Policy in Developing Countries," Journal of Development Economics 78, 156-190.
Tornell, Aaron and Philip R. Lane (1999), \The Voracity Eect," American Economic
Review 89, 22-46.
Turrini, Alessandro, Werner R oger and Istvan Pal Sz ekely (2010), \Banking Crisis, Out-
put Loss and Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7815.
Woo, Jaejoon (2003), \Economic, political, and institutional determinants of public
decits," Journal of Public Economics 87(3-4), 387-426.
23Appendix: Data sources and denitions
Fiscal variables
The scal balance measure is the dierence between general government balance scaled
by GDP in 2009 and 2007. These data are obtained from the `Fiscal Monitor' document,
published the 14th of May 2010 by the International Monetary Fund. This includes
scal data from the World Economic Outlook database published in April 2010 and other
IMF sources. Expenditure and revenues are real growth rates between 2007 and 2009
for general government expenditure and general government revenues. To compute these
we take general government expenditures are revenues (scaled by GDP) from the IMF
Fiscal Monitor. We transform these into real growth rates using current GDP in million of
U.S. dollars and GDP deator from the World Economic Outlook. Structural government
balance is the dierence between cyclically adjusted revenues and expenditure. The source
is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86. Current and projected scal balance in Figure
2 are from the OECD Economic Outlook. Current data are from the December 2009
vintage (No.86). Projected data are from the December 2007 vintage (No.82).
GDP growth
GDP growth is the growth in real output between 2007 and 2009. The source of these
data is the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2010.
Unemployment
Unemployment is the dierence in the unemployment rate in 2007 and 2009. We collect
these data from dierent sources. For advanced countries we use the OECD Economic
Outlook No. 86. Data for eastern European countries are from Eurostat. For the rest of
the countries we use the Labour Statistics Database (LABORSTA) from the International
Labour Organization, the World Bank World Development Indicators and the The World
Factbook from the CIA.
GDP per capita
For GDP per capita we take 2007 gures. The source is Penn World Tables 6.3.
Debt
For government debt we use the 2007 ratio of general government gross debt to GDP. The
source is the IMF Fiscal Monitor. This document uses WEO as its main source.
24Openness
We dene openness as the logarithm of ratio between total exports plus imports scaled by
GDP in 2007. The source of these data is the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Country size
To measure country size we include population gures for 2008. The source of these data
is the World Economic Outlook, April 2010. The regression analysis uses the logarithm
of population.
Exchange rate regime
This is a dummy variable that takes value =0 for the European Monetary Union member
countries, Denmark and countries with exchange rate regime index =1 or =2 in the Ilzetzki
et al (2008) coarse exchange rate classication. It takes value =1 otherwise.
Credit growth
We measure credit growth by taking `claims on the private sector by deposit money banks
and other nancial institutions' from the recently compiled database on nancial structure
by Thorsten et al (2010) at the World Bank. These data are scaled by GDP. We take the
dierence between the 2007 and the 2003 ratios.
Current account balance
We use the current account over GDP ratio for 2007 and the dierence in current account
scaled by GDP in 2009 and 2007. The source of these data is the World Economic Outlook,
April 2010.
Fiscal rule
Fiscal rule is a dummy variable indicating that a national level debt scal rule is in place.
The source of these data is Debrun et al (2008).
Political constraint index
This is the political constraints index developed by Henisz (2000).
25International nancial integration (IFI)
IFI is dened as the sum of foreign assets plus foreign liabilities scaled by GDP in 2007.
In the regressions, we include a dummy variable indicating that the country is integrated
to the international nancial markets. It takes value =1 if the sum of foreign assets plus
foreign liabilities scaled by GDP is greater than 150. It takes value =0 otherwise. The
source of foreign assets and liabilities is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007).
Bond yield
This is the dierence between the 2009 and 2007 ten year government bond nominal
yields. The sources of these data are OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, International
Financial Statistics from the IMF, The Annual Macro-economic Database (AMECO),
Eutostat, Global Financial Data and national sources.
Rating downgrade
This is a dummy variable that takes value =1 if government bonds denominated in foreign
currency are downgraded and =0 otherwise. The source of these data is Moodys.
Real exchange rate
For this variable we take the change in the real eective exchange rate index between
2007 and 2009 (increase means real appreciation). The source of these data is the IMF
International Financial Statistics.
Banking crisis
This is a dummy variable that takes value =1 for Iceland and for countries with total
net expected cost from nancial support measures greater that 3 percent of GDP and =0
otherwise. These are obtained from Table 4 of the IMF Companion Paper - `The State of
Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis,' March 2009.
IMF program
This is a dummy variable that takes value =1 if the country is has an IMF support
program in place and =0 otherwise. The source of these data is the IMF.
ROW growth
This variable is the trade-weighted average of the change in the real GDP growth rate
between 2007 and 2009 in the top ten trading partners of each country. We construct
26trade weights using 2007 bilateral exports plus imports from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS).
































28Table 2: Fiscal balance shift in comparative perspective



















Note: These statistics are computed using the Advanced country sample. Data are from
the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 and No. 80.
29Table 3: Fiscal balance shift in comparative perspective
1973-2007
Country 2007-2009 min mean max
Australia -5.7 -4.1 0.1 3.0
Austria -3.6 -3.6 -0.1 3.9
Belgium -5.5 -7.0 0.3 4.5
Canada -6.4 -5.3 0.1 5.5
Denmark -6.9 -6.8 0.0 6.2
Finland -7.5 -7.7 0.0 5.1
France -5.4 -3.5 -0.2 2.1
Germany -3.4 -6.7 -0.1 7.0
Greece -8.7 -5.6 -0.2 3.2
Iceland -21.1 -3.6 0.3 7.7
Ireland -12.4 -7.3 0.2 5.9
Italy -4.0 -3.9 0.3 4.7
Japan -4.8 -4.2 -0.2 4.2
Netherlands -4.6 -6.4 0.0 8.0
New Zealand -6.2 -1.4 0.7 3.2
Norway -8.0 -6.0 0.7 7.8
Portugal -4.0 -4.1 0.0 3.8
Spain -11.5 -2.5 0.0 4.0
Sweden -5.7 -11.1 -0.1 6.9
Switzerland -2.4 -1.7 0.4 2.4
United Kingdom -9.9 -4.6 0.1 3.6
United States -8.4 -5.0 -0.1 3.0
Note: Data are from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 and No. 80.
30Table 4: Descriptive statistics: advanced countries
Upper Lower
Variable mean median mean median Dierence
(1) Fiscal balance -11.2 -9.9 -3.8 -3.8 7.4***
(2) Expenditure 1.8 15.4 8.1 6.6 6.2
(3) Revenue -21.7 -12.7 -0.8 -1.7 20.9**
(4) Structural balance -7.9 -5.7 -2.1 -1.9 5.8**
(5) Fiscal stimulus -0.4 1.1 1.6 1.1 2.0
(6) GDP growth -3.5 -2.8 -1.7 -1.9 1.8
(7) Unemployment rate 4.4 4.6 0.7 0.7 -3.8***
(8) GDP per capita 40.2 40.9 35.5 36.4 -4.7*
(9) Debt/GDP 50.1 44.1 55.7 59.5 5.6
(10) Openness 56.4 56.5 81.4 86.8 25.0
(11) Country size 61.7 11.1 36.8 21.6 -24.9
(12) Exchange rate regime 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.0 -0.3
(13) Credit growth 56.6 37.8 13.9 14.8 -42.7**
(14) Current account -5.7 -5.3 2.8 3.1 8.5**
(15) Fiscal rule 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.3
(16) Political constraints 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.1*
(17) Bond yield -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1
(18) Rating downgrade -1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6
(19) Real exchange rate -8.2 -2.6 1.4 0.4 9.6*
(20) Banking crisis 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.0 -0.3
(21) IMF program 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
(22) ROW growth -6.7 -6.5 -6.6 -6.7 0.1
(23) Change in current account 4.8 2.4 -1.2 -1.3 -6.1**
Note: Upper group (ordered from the largest general government balance deterioration) is
formed by Iceland, Spain, Ireland, Greece, United States, United Kingdom and Norway.
Lower group (ordered from the smallest general government balance deterioration) is
formed by Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands and Australia. *,
** and *** indicate if the dierences between the means in Upper and Lower groups are
statistically signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
31Table 5: Descriptive statistics: broad sample
Upper Lower
Variable mean median mean median Dierence
(1) Fiscal balance -10.2 -8.3 -2.0 -2.3 8.2***
(2) Expenditure 12.7 13.7 4.6 5.3 -8.1
(3) Revenue -17.3 -12.7 -3.5 -2.2 13.8**
(4) GDP growth -4.6 -2.8 2.5 2.5 7.1***
(5) Unemployment rate 3.8 2.2 0.7 0.4 -3.1***
(6) GDP per capita 32.7 33.9 16.0 10.3 -16.7***
(7) Debt/GDP 44.6 34.1 52.5 47.8 7.8
(8) Openness 109.4 75.6 73.9 65.1 -35.0
(9) Country size 46.8 7.0 152.8 69.7 106.0
(10) Exchange rate regime 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.2
(11) Credit growth 31.3 29.1 3.8 4.9 -27.5**
(12) Current account -1.4 -2.7 2.5 2.3 3.8
(13) Fiscal rule 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.2
(14) Political constraints 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 -0.1*
(15) Bond yield 1.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.3
(16) Rating downgrade -1.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.0*
(17) Real exchange rate 0.5 2.8 0.8 0.0 0.3
(18) Banking crisis 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2**
(19) IMF program 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2*
(20) ROW growth -7.3 -6.5 -6.4 -6.4 0.9*
(21) Change in current account 4.2 2.2 -0.2 -0.5 -4.4*
(22) IFI 680.7 360.1 260.3 132.2 -420**
Note: Upper group (ordered from the largest general government balance deterioration)
is formed by Iceland, Singapore, Spain, Chile, Russia, Ireland, Greece, United States,
Latvia, United Kingdom, Norway, Japan, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, South Africa
and Hong Kong. Lower group (ordered from the largest general government balance
improvement) is formed by Hungary, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Brazil, Switzerland,
Colombia, Argentina, Philippines, Austria, Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Germany, Italy,
Turkey and China. *, ** and *** indicate if the dierences between the means in Upper







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































07 (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth 0.16 -0.05 0.16 0.12
(0.23) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
Unemployment rate -1.06*** -0.94*** -0.92*** -1.06***









Constant -3.86* -4.57*** -4.51*** -4.56***
(2.07) (0.80) (0.82) (0.99)
Observations 22 22 22 22
R2 0.56 0.70 0.64 0.54
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate signicant at 1%,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































07 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP growth -0.18** -0.20** -0.17** -0.18** -0.18*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Unemployment rate -0.77*** -0.73*** -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.76***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
GDP per capita -2.97*** -3.11*** -2.86*** -2.92*** -3.03***











Constant 24.93*** 26.33*** 23.75*** 24.38*** 25.52**
(6.74) (7.57) (6.65) (7.68) (10.27)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate signicant at 1%,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































07 (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth 0.03 -0.27 0.01 -0.06
(0.26) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Unemployment Rate -1.04*** -0.88*** -0.79*** -0.96***









Constant -0.59 -2.06*** -1.97*** -1.87**
(2.18) (0.68) (0.46) (0.70)
Observations 22 22 22 22
R2 0.45 0.58 0.64 0.38
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate signicant at 1%,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































−20 −15 −10 −5 0
change in government balance / gdp
kdensity All kdensity Advanced
Note: Fiscal balance is the dierence in general government balance scaled by GDP be-
tween 2007 and 2009. Density functions are obtained through a kernel density estimation
using an Epanechnikov kernel function.
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Balance 2009 (projected in 2007)











































































−20 −10 0 10 20
GDP growth
Note: Fiscal balance stands for the dierence in general government balance scaled by
GDP between 2007 and 2009. GDP growth is the 2007-2009 growth in real GDP.








































































−20 −10 0 10 20
GDP growth
Note: Unemployment rate stands for the dierence in the unemployment rate between
2007 and 2009. GDP growth is the 2007-2009 growth in real GDP.
45